Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
The agreed definition of CAS at the time is the essentially the same as today's. "Air attacks against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces." W. W. Momyer, " Close Air Support in the USAF, " International Defense Review, vol 1, (1974), 77. defense funding outlays. Money was scarce. At same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were worrying about a Soviet build-up of conventional and nuclear forces that threatened the superpower balance. By the summer of 1974 everything was overshadowed by President's Nixon's Watergate scandal.
2 It was a difficult time to buy airplanes for a lot of reasons. The genesis for the A-10 buy originated from a bit of historical baggage.
Army and USAF Rivalry over CAS
The USAF A-10 acquisition story was part of a long running battle between the Army and the USAF over the CAS mission. Shortly after becoming a separate service, the interservice Key
West Agreement of 1948 specifically assigned the USAF the task to provide CAS for the Army.
Over the next two decades, the two services rehashed this division of responsibility in a number of supplemental agreements. 3 The periodic clash over CAS responsibilities stemmed from the Army's lack of satisfaction of USAF CAS responsiveness and coordination during the Korean War. 4 In general, the Army also felt that the USAF did not put enough priority on the CAS mission. Through the 1950s and early 1960s, the USAF made no effort to field an aircraft specifically designed for CAS. In contrast, the USAF preference pursued multi-mission supersonic aircraft that were optimized for long-range strike and air superiority missions. By early 1970, the services were at an impasse concerning the future of CAS force structure and service roles. In October 1971, the Senate Committee Armed Services convened a special subcommittee to investigate the issue. 15 The subcommittee reviewed all service CAS programs to include service requirements, command and control procedures and current/future weapons platforms. The subcommittee's primary recommendation was for the Department of Defense to redefine and assign CAS roles and missions to reduce counterproductive interservice rivalry.
Until this happened, the special committee recommended each service pursue its acquisition programs. Final decisions on the A-X and Cheyenne programs would come after they were fully tested. 16 The subcommittee's other recommendations had something for everyone. It declared that the Marines' AV-8 Harrier was not a duplicate CAS platform; therefore, the Marines could work the AV-8 program independently of the A-X. The subcommittee thought the competitive A-X fly-off program was a good idea. However, it also recommended a fly-off between the A-X winner and the A-7 aircraft, a concession to congressional supporters of LTV (formerly Ling- Temco-Vought), the maker of the A-7. The subcommittee also determined that the Army had a valid requirement for a more capable attack helicopter. Thus the subcommittee established the battle lines for follow-on congressional battles over CAS platforms. congressional pressure put on the USAF to select Fairchild in order to keep the company alive.
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Others closer to the technical decision assert that Fairchild A-10 had delivered the better aircraft.
In any case, Northrop supporters did not raise much of a complaint. not going to buy more A-7's. The A-10 had been designed for the CAS mission, the A-7 had not. Furthermore, the USAF had not asked for the fly-off. The HASC also uncovered the fact that the USAF had programmed production money for the A-10 but none for the A-7. This put the USAF in a posture of prejudging the fly-off before it occurred. 27 In any event, the fly-off used worst-case weather conditions that "stacked the deck" against the faster A-7 aircraft. 28 The A-10 won the fly-off because the USAF rigged the test, despite strong Senate backing (from Texas). 29 Why? The real issue was the fact that the A-7 was a Navy airplane. 30 The
Schlesinger-Brown deal for the A-10 was holding.
Flying Against the Undercurrent
The A-7 was a minor threat to the A-10 program compared to the persistent undercurrent of opposition that followed from the USAF "high-tech" fighter faction This episode also put the HASC in an embarrassing situation. The HASC supported the A-10. As it was, their bill was going to their Senate counterparts (who supported the A-7) with a "prejudged" A-10 win over the A-7 prior to the fly-off. It is interesting to note how the HASC addresses the problem of legally rewriting the bill's language to make requested A-10 funding contingent on the fly-off outcome. The hearing also enquires about the status of LTV A-7 production line for current and future work, in effect, doing some homework before taking on their Senate counterparts. 28 "Flyoff Between the A-7 and A-10 Aircraft," Briefing before Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, 93d Congress, 2 nd Session, 20 June, 1974 , (Washington DC: GPO, 1974 , 21-27. USAF test pilot testimony had high marks for the A-7's handling and avionics. The pilots generally preferred flying the A-7, but conceded that the A-10 was the better aircraft in poor visibility and low clouds. 29 Sprey, 3 January 2003. This was an irony, the threat of the A-7 rallied support for the A-10 for a season. 30 Gilmore M. Dahl, interview by author, 11 January 2003. Dahl, a retired USAF colonel, was the A-7 division chief at the Air Logistics Center, Tinker AFB in the early 1980s. He notes the total lack of enthusiasm among senior USAF leadership to upgrade or hang on to a Navy airplane. 
Why did the USAF Buy the A-10? The Outcome of Two Battles
Like most inter-agency processes, a number of complex factors shaped the A-10 acquisition decision. Although the story is complicated, this paper argues there were essentially two main battles that were fought over the A-10. The first was an interservice battle between the Army and USAF over the CAS mission. The A-X was the "pawn" employed to kill the Lockheed 31 Christie, 14 January 2003. Programs had to be approved through OSD/DDRE (Engineering and Development) and the DSARC (Defense Systems Acquisition Review Committee). The move to cancel the program at the DSARC was done quietly without OSD/DDRE's coordination. Of note, Christie states that Colonel Perry Smith was the alerting official in the 1975 OSD intervention. Smith was the military assistant to Bill Clements, the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He later became well known in the US as a CNN military analyst during Desert Storm. 32 Christie, 14 January 2003. The first A-10 squadrons moved to the RAF Bentwaters and RAF Woodbridge in 1979. After OSD pointed out there was no plan in the budget to for an A-10 plan on the continent, General David Jones, the USAF Chief of Staff staffed a plan to use four forward operating locations in Germany on a temporary basis. 33 Iovino, 3 January 2003. The Texas congressional delegation was especially vocal. There were four key committees critical to the program, the respective Armed Services and Appropriations Committees in the Senate and House. Of the four, the A-10's biggest threat was from Senator John Tower in the Senate Armed Services Committee. Iovino also recounts how the USAF tried persistently to reduce the program and tried to kill the remaining production in 1983. It was difficult to sustain A-10 funding with hostile USAF staff agencies. 34 Iovino, 3 January 2003. Though the USAF never explicitly stated how a production slow down would impact the final A-10 fleet size, he suspects that the USAF was trying to reduce the final production figure of 727. 35 Christie, 8 January 2003 . By the mid-1980's, the USAF was looking for an A-10 replacement for the CAS mission. The answer was the A-16. This never happened. Among other factors, the A-10's highly successful combat performance in Desert Storm short-circuited this plan. 
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37 The A-10 program was the first battle of a reform movement that took on the USAF's traditional multimission fighter lobby. The Reformers argued that high cost and complex systems led to fewer numbers and lower readiness. The two sides have been commonly categorized as the "quantity" versus "quality" schools. However, the reformers were not against advanced technology per se, but fought against high complexity that led to high cost systems. The LWF program was the reformers' next big battle. See Walter Kross, Military Reform, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1985) , 15-21. 38 Figure 2 describes a four-way alliance of A-10 supporters. With congressional advocacy and top-cover support from the Secretary of Defense and the USAF Chief of Staff, the small A-10 lobby within the OSD and USAF were able to ward off its "high-tech" service and congressional detractors. The detractors are depicted at the bottom, noticeably without a strong contractor-congressional element in the network. The figure also shows the Army's pursuit of the Light Advance Attack Helicopter (LAAH) program after the Cheyenne cancellation. Although the LAAH was no longer an immediate threat, the LAAH kept the USAF focused on the CAS issue.
Conclusion
There is a fair amount of evidence to indicate that the USAF did not plan to use the A-10 for any other purpose than to kill the Army's Cheyenne program--to keep the Army out of the CAS mission. It also appears that the USAF "high-tech" culture would not have pursued the A-10 once the Cheyenne was no longer a threat. But by the time this happened, the program had picked up enough Congressional and OSD support to resist the dominant "high-tech" USAF culture and their congressional allies. Influential voices arguing for a true CAS aircraft prompted the Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to support the A-10. This was the key event.
Schlesinger in turn got the attention of General Brown, the USAF Chief of Staff, offering a deal he could not refuse. In the end, the USAF procured the A-10 because it got a fighter force expansion it wanted. The inter-agency process was ugly; but it worked out for the small A-10 lobby and in later combat operations. The Air Force just had to take some ugly and slow airplanes with the deal.
